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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jonathan Jorge Ponce appeals from his conviction for possession of heroin, entered on a
conditional guilty plea, and argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Jonathan Jorge Ponce was charged with possession of heroin after a narcotics dog alerted
on his vehicle during a traffic stop, officers searched the vehicle, and they recovered heroin. (R.,
pp. 8-14, 24-25.)
Ponce filed a motion to suppress arguing, in relevant part, that the officer who was
processing a citation for the alleged traffic violation―Officer Cannon―engaged in various
conversations with other officers on the scene that unlawfully extended the traffic stop before the
narcotics dog alerted. (R., pp. 30-31, 33-35. 1) In particular, Ponce argued that Officer Cannon
unlawfully extended the stop because, while he was processing the citation, (1) he suggested to
another officer getting Ponce out of the vehicle; (2) he answered a question from another officer
regarding whether a narcotics dog would be deployed; and, (3) he directed another officer to talk
with the passenger of the vehicle. (R., p. 34.)
At the hearing on the motion, the parties stipulated to the admission of four videos
associated with the traffic stop: the dash-cam video from the patrol car driven by one of the
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Ponce also argued that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop (R., pp. 3233) and that certain incriminating statements made after the dog alerted should have been
excluded because he was not given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), (R., pp. 35-37). The district court rejected both of those arguments. (Tr., p. 71, Ls. 6-20;
p. 72, L. 25 – p. 74, L. 10.) On appeal, Ponce does not argue that it erred in doing so.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7, n. 14). Thus, the only issue on appeal concerns whether the stop was
unlawfully extended before the narcotics dog alerted.
1

officers on scene, Officer Erickson; body-cam video from the canine officer, Officer Knisley;
body-cam video from Officer Erickson; and body-cam video from another officer on scene,
Officer Scholten. (Tr., p. 4, L. 9 – p. 5, L. 21. 2)
Officer Cannon testified that, in the evening of July 25, 2019, he observed a vehicle make
several turns without using a turn signal. (Tr., p. 9, L. 10 – p. 11, L. 10.) Because his police
vehicle was unmarked, without a dash-cam, and he did not have his body-cam on that evening,
he requested another officer to initiate a traffic stop. (Id.) Officer Erickson responded and
initiate a traffic stop of the vehicle, driven by Ponce. (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 4-13; p. 41, L. 9 – p. 42, L.
12.)
Officer Cannon arrived at the scene roughly thirty seconds later while Officer Erickson
was gathering information, a driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance from Ponce.
(Tr., p. 13, Ls. 3-19.) After gathering Ponce’s information, Officer Erickson relayed it to Officer
Cannon, who recognized that Ponce’s California plates were expired and recalled that he had
previously encountered Ponce and warned “him about his expired plates.” (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 10-21.)
Officer Cannon therefore decided to issue a citation for expired registration and asked Officer
Erickson if he could use the “e-ticket machine” in Officer Erickson’s patrol car, as the unmarked
vehicle he was driving did not have one. (Tr., p. 13, L. 20 – p. 14, L. 4; Ex. 1c, 03:29 – 03:50.)
Officer Cannon began processing the citation and running Ponce’s information through
the in-car computer. (Tr., p. 16, L. 11 – p. 17, L. 9.) When he noticed that Ponce’s address was
listed in the system as being in Spokane, but the car he was driving had California plates, he
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Those videos are in the record in files titled 1573240, 1573262, 1576724, 1574124,
respectively. Following the convention adopted below and by Ponce on appeal, the state will
refer to these videos as Exhibits 1a – 1d, respectively. References are to the run-time of the
videos.
2

asked Officer Erickson to clarify Ponce’s current address and secure a telephone number. (Tr., p.
17, L. 11 – p. 18, L. 4; Ex. 1a, 06:00 – 06:13.) While Officer Erickson was securing that
information, another officer, Officer Scholten, asked Officer Cannon whether he wanted Officer
Scholten to “chat” with Ponce about “leaving that area” or whether he should just “leave it,” and
whether Officer Cannon was going to “get a sniff or anything” or “just get out of here.” (Ex. 1a,
06:15 – 06:22.)

Officer Cannon responded that he was processing a citation for expired

registration, that Officer Scholten should “leave it,” and “eight-two” is on. 3 (Ex. 1a, 06:22 –
06:30.) Office Cannon testified that he continued to process the citation during this conversation.
(Tr., p. 18, L. 5 – p. 20, L. 3; p. 36, L. 1 – p. 37, L. 12.) Meanwhile, Officer Erickson secured
and returned the information requested by Officer Cannon. (Ex. 1c, 04:45 – 06:25.) When he
did so, he asked Officer Cannon if there was anything else he could do to expedite the stop while
Officer Cannon was processing the citation, and Officer Cannon asked if he would have Ponce
step out of the car and explain to Ponce that Officer Cannon was writing him a citation for
expired registration. (Ex. 1a, 10:05 – 10:15; Ex. 1c, 08:25 – 08:54.) Officer Cannon then asked
Officer Scholten if he would talk with the passenger, as he recognized her as someone they had
previously encountered. (Ex. 1a, 11:55 – 12:27.) Again, he testified that he continued to process
the citation and this brief conversation did not delay him in any way. (Tr., p. 20, L. 4 – p. 21, L.
12; p. 36, L. 1 – p. 37, L. 12.) Officer Cannon then attempted to print the citation, but had
difficulties with the printer. (Ex. 1a, 12:40 – 16:30; Tr., p. 21, L. 13 – p. 22, L. 15.) During that
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Ponce points to his memorandum in support of the motion to suppress for the claim that
“‘eight-two’ refers to Officer Amy Knisley, who operates the K9 unit.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 3,
n. 4 (citing R., p. 31).) The state is not aware of any evidence in the record―as opposed to
unsupported argument―that “eight-two” does so. But Officer Cannon did testify that, while he
continued to process the citation, he conversed with Officer Scholten regarding, inter alia,
whether a K9 unit was “either on shift or was going to arrive.” (Tr., p. 21, Ls. 1-4.)
3

period and before he was able to print the citation, a narcotics dog arrived and alerted on the
vehicle. (Ex. 1a, 14:30 – 15:10; Tr., p. 22, L. 16 – p. 23, L. 10.) Officer Cannon immediately
went to talk to Ponce about the citation when he had it printed. (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 6-14.) Because a
narcotics dog alerted on the vehicle, it was searched and officers recovered a “black tar”
substance. (Tr., p. 23, L. 16 – p. 26, L. 17.)
At the hearing, defense counsel argued that the stop was unlawfully extended because of
“a conversation regarding a dog sniff” and “a conversation regarding the passenger,” neither of
which, he argued, “had anything to do with a traffic stop.” (Tr., p. 62, Ls. 14-19.)
The district court denied the motion to suppress. (Tr., p. 71, L. 6 – p. 74, L. 10.)
Concerning the only issue on appeal, whether the stop was unlawfully extended, the court found
that Officer Cannon did not abandon or deviate from the purpose of the stop by asking other
officers to assist, and that his brief conversations “didn’t add any time” to the stop because
Officer Cannon continued to process the citation while he spoke with other officers on scene.
(Tr., p. 71, L. 21 – p. 72, L. 24.)
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Ponce entered a conditional guilty plea,
reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp. 56-60.) The district
court imposed a sentence of three years with one year fixed and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp. 7678. 4) Ponce timely appealed. (R., pp. 85-87.)
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Ponce was also sentenced in association with another case―CR28-20-6055―not at issue here.
(R., pp. 76-78.)
4

ISSUE
Ponce states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Ponce’s motion to suppress because the
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify a deviation from the purpose of
the traffic stop?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Ponce failed to show the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress where
he has not challenged the court’s factual finding that Officer Cannon’s conversations with other
officers did not add time to the stop?

5

ARGUMENT
Ponce Has Not Shown The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
On appeal, as below, Ponce does not dispute that a narcotics dog alerted on his vehicle

and that that alert provided reasonable suspicion to initiate a new detention for a drug
investigation and probable cause for a search of the vehicle. Instead, as he did below, Ponce
argues that the stop was unlawfully extended prior to the dog’s alert because Officer Cannon had
various conversations with other officers while processing his citation that, he claims, constituted
a “deviation” from the purpose of the stop. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-12.)
The district court found that Officer Cannon’s brief conversations with other officers
while he worked to complete the citation did not “add any time” to the stop. (Tr., p. 71, L. 21 –
p. 72, L. 24.) Ponce does not contest that factual finding and has therefore not shown it is clearly
erroneous. He is also mindful of Idaho Supreme Court authority holding that a traffic stop is not
unlawfully extended (or, extended at all) by conduct that does not “add time” to the stop.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) It follows that he has not shown that the district court erred by denying
his motion to suppress.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to those facts. State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). “At
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
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weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Pieper, 163
Idaho 732, 734, 418 P.3d 1241, 1243 (Ct. App. 2018).
C.

Officer Cannon’s Conversations With Other Officers While He Processed A Citation Did
Not Unlawfully Extend The Stop
Ponce has failed to show that Officer Cannon unlawfully extended the purpose of the

traffic stop.
“The seizure of a vehicle’s occupants in order to investigate a traffic violation is a
‘reasonable seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment so long as the seizing officer had reasonable
suspicion that a violation occurred.” State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608, 389 P.3d 150, 153
(2016). The seizure may last as long as “necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); see Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015).
“The stop remains a reasonable seizure while the officer diligently pursues the purpose of the
stop, to which that reasonable suspicion is related. However, should the officer abandon the
purpose of the stop, the officer no longer has that original reasonable suspicion supporting his
actions.” Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016). “[W]hen an officer abandons his
or her original purpose, the officer has for all intents and purposes initiated a new seizure with a
new purpose; one which requires its own reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
But even when conduct constitutes a “deviation” from the purpose of the stop, in the
sense that it is not directly related to the reason the stop was initiated, it does not thereby
constitute an abandonment and does not unlawfully extend the stop. Obviously, a traffic stop is
not “unlawfully extended” by conduct that does not extend the duration of the stop at all. As
Ponce acknowledges, the Idaho Supreme Court held in State v. Pylican, 167 Idaho 745, 477 P.3d
180 (2020), that officers do not “abandon the purpose” of a traffic stop and do not unlawfully
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extend it merely because an officer on scene does something that is not directly related to the
purpose of the stop. Instead, conduct unlawfully extends a traffic stop only if it “adds time” to
the stop. Id. at ___, 477 P.3d at 189-90 (holding that dog sniff on exterior of vehicle did not
unlawfully extend traffic stop because another officer was diligently pursuing the purpose of the
stop and so the dog sniff did not add “extra time” to the stop). See
also -Illinois
Caballes,
- --- - - - -v.- - - - - - 543
U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005) (dog sniff on exterior of vehicle did not violate Fourth Amendment
where it was completed while officers were diligently pursuing the initial purpose of the stop);
State v. Renteria, 163 Idaho 545, 549, 415 P.3d 954, 958 (Ct. App. 2018) (where one officer
questioned defendant regarding narcotics while another officer processed a citation, and where
officers later discussed suspicions regarding narcotics while they waited for response from
dispatch, traffic stop was not unlawfully extended because the officers were diligently pursuing
the original purpose of the stop at all times).
Here, the district court found that the conversations between Officer Cannon and other
officers on scene did not add any time to the stop because they occurred while Officer Cannon
was processing the citation. (Tr., p. 71, L. 21 – p. 72, L. 24.) Ponce does not challenge that
finding on appeal. Even if he had, there is substantial evidence to support it. Officer Cannon
testified that he was working on the citation as he spoke with both Officer Erickson and Officer
Scholten and that those conversations did not delay him in any way. (Tr., p. 17, L. 2 – p. 21, L.
10; p. 36, L. 1 – p. 37, L. 12.) The district court found Officer Cannon credible and there is no
contrary evidence.
Because Ponce has not challenged the district court’s conclusion that Officer Cannon’s
conversations with other officers on scene did not add any time to the stop, he has not shown that
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those conversations unlawfully extended the stop. He therefore has not shown that the district
court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Ponce’s judgment of conviction.
DATED this 26th day of February, 2021.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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JACOB L. WESTERFIELD
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/s/ Andrew V. Wake
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